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SECURITIES 
COMMENTARY 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE "IN 
CONNECTION WITH" REQUIRE:MENT OF RULE 
lOb-5 
Barbara Black* 
Not every fraud involving a security is securities fraud for 
the purpose of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
19341 and its Rule 10b-5 (the rule).2 The rule requires that the 
fraud be "in connection with" a purchase or sale of a security.3 
In its 1971 decision, Superintendent of Insurance of New York 
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.;' the Supreme Court held that a 
Rule 10b-5 claim was stated where the fraud involved the misap-
propriation of the proceeds of a sale of securities, because the 
seller "suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices 
touching its sale of securities as an investor."LI Subsequently, the 
.. Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
I 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). 
2 17 C.F.R. 240.10b·5 (1986). 
3 Rule 10b·5 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the usa of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mnils or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to stute a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). 
The "in connection with" language also requires that the plaintiff in a private action 
must be a purchaser or seller of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723 (1975). 
• 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
& 404 U.S. at 12-13. The facts of Bankers Life are complicated but well known. The 
purchaser of all the stock of Manhattan Casualty Co. paid for the stock with the pro-
539 
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necessary connection was often described as a "de minimis touch 
test"6 and, prior to 1984, the "in connection with" requirement 
was not generally viewed as posing a significant obstacle in es-
tablishing a securities fraud case. 
The Second Circuit, however, in its 1984 decision, Chemical 
Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' made it clear that something 
more than "de minimis" was required.s Some district courts in 
the Second Circuit read Chemical Bank as requiring that the 
misrepresentation relate to the security's value in order to sat-
isfy the "in connection with" requirement.9 However, SEC v. 
Drysdale Securities Corp.,to decided in the Second Circuit's 
1985-86 term, made it clear that the misrepresentation need not 
involve the investment characteristics of the securities in order 
to be sufficiently connected to the securities transaction. Never-
theless, what "in connection with" requires remains a source of 
uncertainty. Since 1984, the "in connection with" requirement 
has been described both as "broad"ll and as "stringent. "12 
Courts address the "in connection with" requirement in the 
context of two different issues. First, the lack of the requisite 
connection goes to the question of federal jurisdiction. Thus, 
even though there may be a security involved, the alleged mis-
conduct may not have occurred in a securities transaction. 
Rather, properly analyzed, the plaintiff's allegations consist of 
common-law fraud claims involving a breach of fiduciary duty or 
commercial fraud and, hence, are outside the scope of federal 
securities fraud jurisdiction. In this situation, the "in connection 
with" requirement is necessary to limit Rule 10b-5 jurisdiction 
ceeds of the sale of the corporation's own treasury bonds. The Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiff, representing the corporation, could bring a Rule IOb-5 action as seller of 
the bonds, since it was defrauded by the misappropriation of the proceeds. 
• E.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028 (6th Cir. 1979) 
("the alleged deceptive practice only need be 'toUching' the sale of securities") (citing 
Banker's Life, 404 U.S. at 12-13). 
7 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984). 
8 See id. at 943. ("The Act and Rule impose liability for a proscribed act in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security; it is not sufficient to allege that a defendant 
has committed a proscribed act in a transaction of which the pledge of a security is a 
part.") See text accompanying notes 17-23 infra. 
• See, e.g., SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), reu'd, 
785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986). See also notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra. 
10 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986). 
II United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986). 
12 Crummere v. Smith Barney, 624 F. Supp. 751, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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so that the rule does not encompass all of common-law fraud. 
Second, even though there is a securities transaction that is 
more closely linked to the fraud, nevertheless, the court may de-
termine that the fraud did not cause the injury complained of, 
and therefore it was not "in connection with" the securities 
transaction. The Second Circuit analyzes this requirement in 
terms of "loss causation"13 while other circuits use the tradi-
tional "proximate cause."14 Only private plaintiffs need to estab-
lish "loss causation." The requirement stems from Rule 10b-5's 
resemblance to the common law tort of deceit111 and the courts' 
perception that it is necessary to limit damages.I6 In these cases, 
the fraud may have induced the stock purchase, but it did not 
relate to the security's value, or was not otherwise foreseeably 
related to an injury arising from a securities transaction and, 
therefore, is not actionable under Rule 10b-5. 
Thus, while the "in connection with" and causation require-
ments are analytically distinct, they are related t-O each other, 
and discussion of the first requirement may merge with discus-
sion of the second. As the securities transaction becomes more 
removed from the fraudulent conduct, it becomes less likely that 
the damages suffered resulted from the securities transaction. 
This Commentary examines the evolution of the "in connection 
with" requirement within the Second Circuit, focusing on cases 
decided in the 1985-86 term. It attempts to illustrate the direc-
tion the Circuit has taken in dealing with complex issues of se-
curities fraud. 
I. THE Chemical Bank AND Drysdale DECISIONS 
In Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & CO.,17 four banks 
made a series of loans to Frigitemp Corp. and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Elsters, Inc. As part of one transaction, Frigitemp 
pledged the stock of Elsters. The banks alleged that they en-
" See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974). See also 
notes 73-75 and accompanying text infra. 
If See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), modi-
fied, 495 U.S. 375 (1983). 
.. 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3880 (1969). 
,. See Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975); Globus v. Law 
Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1292 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.s. 913 (1970); List 
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) • 
.. 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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tered into the transaction in reliance on Frigitemp's financial 
statements certified by the defendant, the corporation's auditor 
Arthur Andersen & Co. (Andersen), which materially misstated 
Frigitemp's financial health. The district court denied Ander-
sen's motion to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. IS It found 
that the pledge of the Elsters stock was a sale of the stock and, 
relying on Bankers Life, that the alleged fraud occurred "in con-
nection with" the pledge. 
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that a 
pledge of stock was a sale of securities. It found, however, that 
there was no connection between the fraud and the pledge. 
Judge Friendly did not view these loans as securities transac-
tions, but rather as commercial transactions, which happened to 
involve the pledge of securities. Thus, the court emphasized the 
incidental nature of the pledge transaction and questioned 
whether any significant advantage to the banks' position was 
achieved by the pledge.19 
Subsequently, some district courts in the Second Circuit 
read Chemical Bank as requiring that the misrepresentation re-
late to the security's value in order to satisfy the "in connection 
with" requirement.2o While the Chemical Bank panel empha-
sized that no alleged misstatement related to the Elsters com-
mon stock,21 this served to underscore the court's view that the 
pledge was an incidental and insignificant transaction. Judge 
Friendly demonstrated the attenuated connection between the 
alleged misstatements about Frigitemp and the pledge of Elsters 
stock by describing the banks' argument in terms of causation: if 
the accounting firm had not made misstatements about Frig-
itemp, the banks would not have made the loans to Frigitemp 
and Elsters and hence would not have taken the securities as 
collateral for the loan. He stated, however, that "[s]uch 'but-for' 
causation is not enough. "22 
18 552 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
1. 726 F.2d at 943 n.21. 
•• See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd. 785 
F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986); Crummere v. Smith Barney, 646 F. Supp. 751, 755 (S.D. N.Y. 
1985); Moran v. Kidder Peabody, 617 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kimmco Energy 
Corp. v. Jones, 603 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also notes 43-49 and accompanying 
text infra . 
• 1 726 F.2d at 943 . 
•• Id. "[Tlhe Banks' 'but·for' allegation merely established 'transaction causation' 
... they have failed to establish the 'loss causation' necessary for a legally sufficient 
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It would be anomalous to hold that commercial bank loans procured 
by fraud are generally not within § lOeb) and Rule lOb·5, but that 
they become so, even though of a sort that no one would have consid-
ered to constitute a security, if collateralized with a security, although 
no misrepresentation was made with respect to the latter." 
543 
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Drysdale Secur-
ities Corp.,24 the SEC sued the broker-dealer, three of its princi-
pals, and a partner in the accounting firm that prepared finan-
cial statements for Drysdale. The SEC claimed that the 
accountant prepared financial statements that concealed the 
firm's substantial capital deficit. Drysdale was in the govern-
ment securities business in both the cash market and the repur-
chase agreements (repos) market. The latter constituted two 
types of transactions: Drysdale engaged in sale and repurchase 
agreements (repos) which it structured as sales of the securities 
by Drysdale subject to an agreement to repurchase them at a 
fixed price at a later date. Drysdale also engaged in reverse sale 
and purchase agreements (reverse repos), which it structured as 
purchases by Drysdale of the securities subject to an agreement 
to resell them at a fixed price at a later date. The SEC did not 
contend that the repos or reverse repos were securities. 
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the 
case was governed by Chemical Bank.2 /j According to the district 
court, Chemical Bank required a direct link between the misrep-
resentation and the securities involved in the transaction, a con-
nection that was absent here.28 Because the misstatements did 
not relate to the value of the government securities themselves, 
but to the financial position of the firm, the court held that the 
alleged fraud was not "in connection with" the purchase or sale 
of securities.27 
The Second Circuit reversed.28 In its opinion, the court con-
centrated on distinguishing Chemical Bank. The court did not 
accept the defendants' view that Drysdale's repo was the same 
claim under § lOb and Rule 10b·5." ld. at n.23. See also text accompanying notes 33-35 
infra. 
23 726 F.2d at 944. 
•• 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986) . 
.. 606 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) • 
•• ld. at 299 . 
..,. ld . 
.. 785 F.2d at 38. 
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as the short-term collateralized loan in Chemical Bank. Unlike 
the traditional collateralized loan involved in Chemical Bank, in 
these repo and reverse repo transactions, the holder of the secur-
ities was free to deal in them. In a reverse repo transaction, the 
firm's obligation to resell the securities to the other party de-
pended upon the firm's financial ability to repurchase identical 
securities in the marketplace, since the common practice was to 
sell the securities upon entering the reverse repo agreement. 
Similarly, the firm's obligation in a repo transaction to repur-
chase the securities at a later date depended more on the securi-
ties' appreciation in value than it otherwise would have, given 
the firm's insolvency. Finally, the securities held by Drysdale 
were assets available for satisfaction of its debts and thus could 
be seized by creditors. Hence, what this arrangement was worth 
to the party on the other side of the transaction depended sub-
stantially on the financial health of Drysdale. Therefore, unlike 
Chemical Bank, misrepresentations about the financial health of 
the company were closely linked to the transfers of the securities 
involved.29 The Second Circuit concluded that: 
[u]nlike a pledge of securities in a traditional secured financing, in 
which the financial health of the lender is irrelevant to the value of 
both the pledged securities and the pledge itself, [Drysdale's] financial 
strength was essential to the value received by the other party in a 
securities transaction. 30 
The Second Circuit took a different approach in Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Securities Corp.31 Manu-
facturers Hanover was an action for private damages involving 
the same defendants and allegations as in the SEC action 
against Drysdale. The bank obtained a judgment against the de-
fendants for $17 million after a jury trial. In affirming this deci-
sion, the appeals court had no difficulty finding that there was a 
sufficiently close connection with a securities transaction to sat-
isfy the jurisdictional requirement.32 Rather, the court focused 
on the issue of loss causation, i.e., causation not merely in induc-
ing the plaintiff to enter into the transaction, but causation of 
•• Id. at 42. 
30 Id. For the conclusion of the SEC litigation, see SEC Litigation Rei. No. 11318, 6 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) \I 73,523 at C3, 398-13 (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 22, 1986). 
31 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986) . 
.. Id. at 20. 
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the actual loss suffered.33 Loss causation requires that the dam-
age complained of be one of the foreseeable consequences of the 
misrepresentation.3• The court held that loss causation was 
shown, even though the misrepresentation did not relate to the 
government securities, because: 
although the misrepresentation in the present case did not go to the 
investment characteristics of the underlying government securities -
and, under our holding in Drysdale, this was not required - it did go 
to the investment quality of the repos since, presumably, [Manufac-
turers Hanover] would not have contracted with [Drysdale] to 
purchase and sell government securities had [Manufacturers Hanover] 
known of the misrepresentation regarding [Drysdale's] finances, par-
ticularly given that the .•. statements [by Arthur Andersen & Co.] 
were in part a response to the financial community's concern regard-
ing [Drysdale's] stability.sa 
n. THE REQUIREMENT OF SECURITIES FRAUD 
Rule lOb-5 provides a cause of action for securities fraud 
only; the rule does not redress injuries occasioned by other 
forms of misconduct. Courts have had difficulty in distinguishing 
securities fraud from other types of fraud in two areas: breach of 
fiduciary duty claims (including corporate mismanagement) and 
commercial transactions. In addition, a recent Second Circuit 
case illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing two kinds of fed-
eral fraud - securities and commodities.3s Apart from the 
court's statement in Chemical Bank that the involvement of se-
curities must be more than incidental, the courts have provided 
little guidance on how to determine, in borderline situations, 
whether the alleged fraud occurred in a securities transaction. 
Indeed, the cases repeatedly warn of the dangers of generaliza-
tion and stress the need to decide the issue on a case-by-case 
basis.37 
Set forth below is an analysis of other recent Second Circuit 
opinions discussing the "in connection with" requirement, di-
vided into breach of duty, commercial transactions, and com-
S3 ld. 
s< ld. at 20-21. 
so ld. at 22. 
.8 See Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1986). See text accompany-
ing notes 70-71 infra . 
• 7 E.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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modities fraud categories. In some instances, the courts found 
that no securities transaction had taken place at all. In others, 
the securities transaction was distant in time to the alleged mis-
conduct. In still others, the securities transaction was an insig-
nificant part of the conduct that was the basis of the complaint. 
In all three situations the fraud alleged was not deemed to be 
securities fraud. 
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Claims involving breach of fiduciary duty accompanied by 
material misstatements where the connection between the fraud 
and the securities transaction is remote should not be actionable 
under Rule lOb-5.3s Yet a number of significant cases evidence 
the continuing difficulty in drawing the line between common-
law breach of duty claims and federal securities fraud claims. In 
some of these cases, the courts have found that, while there are 
securities involved in the alleged fraud, there is no "purchase or 
sale." Thus, a claim based on theft or conversion of securities is 
not recognizable under'Rule lOb-5. 
Pross v. Katz39 illustrates the Second Circuit's refusal to al-
Iowa plaintiff to recast breach of fiduciary duty claims into fed-
eral securities claims. Over an eight-year period, the plaintiff 
purchased a number of limited partnership interests in real es-
tate ventures at the defendant's urging. Later, the defendant al-
legedly committed various fraudulent acts that divested the 
plaintiff of his ownership interest in the investments. The court 
did not discuss specifically the nature of the plaintiff's divest-
ment of his ownership interest, and it did not ever consider that 
the divestment itself could be the basis for federal jurisdiction. 
Instead, the Second Circuit emphatically stated that "the com-
3D This is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. u. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe Industries, minority shareholders challenged, as 
fraud under Rule lOb·5, a short-form merger between the majority shareholder of the 
corporation, which allegedly accomplished a freezeout of the minority shareholders at an 
inadequate price. In holding that claims under Rule lOb-5 require more than a showing 
of corporate misconduct, rather, that they require a showing of manipUlative or decep-
tive conduct, the Supreme Court expressed concern about extending Rule lOb·5 jurisdic-
tion over "a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation." I d. 
at 478-79. The Court expressed fear that such an extension of the federal securities laws 
would result in an increase in unnecessary and vexatious litigation in the federal courts, 
as well as inappropriate interference with state-law regulation. Id. at 478-79. 
3' 784 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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plaint here alleges no more than a conversion of property that 
happened to involve securities. We are unwilling to extend the 
reach of the securities law to every conversion or theft of 
security. "40 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bankers Life41 is, of course, 
the leading case on drawing the line between breach of fiduciary 
duty and securities fraud by reason of the "in connection with" 
requirement and affords an instructive contrast with Pross. In 
Bankers Life, the Second Circuit had affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated 
nothing more than breach of fiduciary duty. The Second Circuit 
stated that "there is a structural difference between the sale of 
the corporation's bonds at a concededly fair price and the subse-
quent fraudulent misappropriation of the proceeds received."42 
Thus, the Second Circuit found that where the plaintiff alleged 
theft, albeit theft of the proceeds of stock sales, the securities 
transaction was incidental to the fraud. The corporation would 
have suffered the same injury if the defendants had misappro-
priated the proceeds of a sale of any other property. The Su-
preme Court, however, took the view that where the link be-
tween the securities sale and the fraud is close in time and 
where the sale is crucial to the fraud, the securities transaction 
is not merely incidental to the fraud, and, therefore, there is ju-
risdiction under Rule lOb-5 . .f3 Thus, while under Bankers Life, a 
conventional sale of securities followed by misappropriation of 
the proceeds is fraud in connection with a securities transaction, 
under Pross, the ore direct conversion or theft of securities is 
not securities fraud because of the absence of a securities 
transaction. 
The distinction between a sale of stock, followed by conver-
sion of the proceeds, and conversion of the stock itself is a fine 
one, but it is one that can be justified as necessary, after Bank-
ers Life, to establish the boundary between common-law fraud 
•• Id. at 459. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that a brokerage firm's occa-
sionalliquidation of a customer's securities account to finance unauthorized trades in ita 
co=odities account made out a Rule 10b-5 claim, "in light of the brD:ld interpretation 
that courts lend to the 'in connection with' requirement." Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274, 1277 (5th Cir. 1985). 
41 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The facts are summarized at note 5 supra • 
•• 430 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1970) • 
•• Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12. 
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and securities fraud.·· Some district courts in the Second Cir-
cuit, however, have obliterated that distinction and have in ef-
fect overruled Bankers Life by relying on Chemical Bank. Curi-
ously, these cases involved customers' complaints against 
brokers for alleged misconduct in the handling of their accounts. 
Although the connection between the fraud and the trading pro-
cess makes a securities fraud claim appropriate, these courts 
have ruled that the complaints state only common-law claims. 
In Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc.,·" 
the plaintiff charged that her broker persuaded her to sell off 
some securities and then converted the proceeds. Without citing 
Bankers Life, the district court dismissed the complaint, treat-
ing it as a simple conversion claim. Moreover, it held that mis-
statements made by the broker to conceal the fraud were not a 
basis for jurisdiction under Rule lOb-5, because the court read 
Chemical Bank as requiring that the misstatements relate to 
specific securities .• 8 Similarly, in Moran v. Kidder Peabody & 
CO.,"7 the district court dismissed a customer's Rule lOb-5 claim 
against his broker for unauthorized trading in his account, stat-
ing that "[ w ]hether or not a broker faithfully performs a cus-
tomer's orders is an agency question. ".8 The trend in the district 
courts to dismiss actions against brokers in reliance on Chemical 
Bank has continued, despite the fact that the Second Circuit 
made it clear in Drysdale that misrepresentations need not per-
tain to the securities themselves .• 9 
•• cr. lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1014 n.26 (2d Cir. 1975): "[a] line must bo 
drawn somewhere .... " 
•• Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc., 624 F. Supp. 751 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1567·68 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("bootstrapping" of a conversion claim not permitted). In contrast, tho 
Sixth Circuit has held that a brokerage firm's wrongful refusal to return plaintiff's bonds, 
which had been pledged as collateral, made out a Rule 10b·5 claim. Mansbach v. Pres· 
cott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979) . 
•• Crumm ere, 624 F. Supp. at 755 . 
.. 617 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Contra Jaksich v. Thomson McKinnon Soc., 
582 F. Supp. 485, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (where achievement of a fraud is directly related 
to the trading process, the "in connection with" requirement is met) . 
•• 617 F. Supp. at 1068. See also Schwartz v. Gordon, 761 F.2d 864, 869·70 (2d Cir. 
1985) (request to amend complaint to state a Rule 10b·5 claim against broker for unau· 
thorized investment of Keogh funds in high risk bonds denied); Baum v. Phillips, Appol 
& Walden, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (unauthorized trading by 
broker does not state a Rule 10b·5 claim) . 
•• See, e.g., Nevitsky v. Manufacturers Hanover Brokerage Serv., 654 F. Supp. 116, 
119 n.12 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) ("a misrepresentation concerning the mechanics of a securities 
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As an alternative to finding no "purchase or sale" as a 
means of limiting the scope of the federal securities laws, courts 
may find the requisite connection too remote where the 
purchase or sale was either distant in time to the fraud or an 
insignificant aspect of the fraud.I5O For example, in Bloor v. 
Carro, Spanbock, Landin, Rodman & Pass,151 the plaintiff, the 
reorganization trustee for Investors Funding Corporation of New 
York (IFC), alleged that corporate management mismanaged 
and converted proceeds from the sale of stock. Without deciding 
the question, the court expressed doubt as to whether there was 
an "adequate connection" between the securities sales and any 
damage suffered by IFC.152 Since every corporation issues stock, 
allowing the plaintiff to trace the proceeds to an act of misman-
agement could inappropriately convert every state-law deriva-
tive claim of corporate mismanagement into a federal securities 
claim. Furthermore, since every act of corporate mismanagement 
would adversely affect the stock's market value, an overly broad 
interpre~tion of the "touch" test would encompass all these 
claims brought by traders in the stock as welp3 
The district court's decisions in the !FC litigationM illus-
trate the difficulties in formulating workable principles. The dis-
transaction, without particular regard to the nature of the securities themselves, is not 
actionable under section 10(b)."}; Bochicchio v. Smith Barney [1986·87 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) '\I 93,024 at 95,118 (S.D.N.Y. Nov •• 17, 1986). In contrast, the 
Third and Ninth Circuits have held that a broker's misrepresentations about the risks in 
buying stock on margin make out a Rule 10b·5 claim. See Angela.stro v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985); Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981). 
&0 For an excellent example of a situation where the securities transaction 'I';ns an 
insignificant part of the transaction, see Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1985). In 
Head, the defendant's former wife unsuccessfully attempted to challenge their property 
settlement agreement on securities fraud grounds. The only securities in\·olved in the 
transaction were defendant's shares of his closely-held corporation, which had been 
placed in escrow to secure payment of his obligations to the plaintiff. The defendant 
duly satisfied the obligation, the stock was returned to him, and it was subsequently sold 
for $45 million. Not surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit found no connection between the 
pledge of stock and any alleged fraud. 
&1 754 F.2d 57 (2<1 Cir. 1985). 
02 Id. at 61. Accord Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 529 
(9th Cir. 1976) ("[t]he nexus between the securities transaction and the alleged lcr~ 
due to mismanagement is too attenuated in this case to use as a predicate for section 
10(b) liability"). 
03 Natowitz v. Mehlman, 567 F. Supp. 942, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
M In re Investors Funding Corp. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 566 F. 
Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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trict court drew a distinction between the trustee's claims based 
on looting of the proceeds and those based on improvident in-
vesting of the proceeds. While the former claims might meet the 
"in connection with" requirement on the basis of Bankers Life, 
the latter did not, since they were precisely the kind of corpo-
rate mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty claims that 
are regulated by state law. 55 
Similarly, in Pross v. Katz/6 the court refused to find a link 
between the plaintiff's purchases of the limited partnership in-
terests and the subsequent fraud that was close enough to meet 
the "in connection with" requirement. The court found that: 
[a]n intent to cause a conversion of ownership interests at some un-
certain future time and through uncertain means does not bring fed-
eral law into play, even though that intent is held at the time a 
purchase or sale of securities occurs. The steps to be taken to effectu-
ate the fraud are not integral to the purchase and sale of the securities 
in question and are to occur only well after the securities transaction 
has been completed. Other transactions or events may intervene and 
cause the plan to be abandoned.57 
On the other hand, the, court noted that if the original sale to 
the plaintiff had involved conduct that facilitated the later 
fraud, then the requisite connection would have been present. 
"We believe a securities transaction that entails as one of its in-
tegral steps the fraudulent securing of blank signature pages for 
purposes of a later conversion alleges a fraud 'in connection 
with' the purchase or sale of securities."58 
In contrast to the above-mentioned breach of duty claims, 
in the insider trading area, the Second Circuit has continued to 
refuse to characterize misappropriation of confidential informa-
tion for illicit stock gains as merely a breach of fiduciary duty. 
In United States v. Carpenter/9 the Second Circuit summarily 
rejected as "frivolous" the defendant's contention that his mis-
conduct was not connected with securities transactions. The de-
fendant, a columnist for the Wall Street Journal, was convicted 
of misappropriating information about the timing and content of 
certain columns, as a participant in a trading ring that traded on 
•• 523 F. Supp. at 538·39 . 
•• 784 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1986) . 
• 7 Id. at 459 . 
•• [d • 
•• 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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the information in advance of its publication. The Second Cir-
cuit thus followed its 1981 decision in United States v. New-
man,60 where the lack of connection argument was quickly re-
jected, "since appellee's sole purpose in participating in the 
misappropriation of confidential takeover information was to 
purchase shares of the target companies."o1 
It is not possible to generalize on the requisite closeness of 
the connection between the misconduct and the securities trans-
action, except to say that the securities transaction must be 
more than incidental to the fraud, or as one court phrased it, the 
securities transaction must be "an integral or helpful compo-
nent" of the fraud.62 The limitless possibilities of fact variations 
that might make the securities transaction more or less remote 
from the alleged fraud explain why the courts feel incapable of 
deciding the cases except upon specific facts.o3 
B. Commercial Transactions 
The distinction between a securities investment and a com-
mercialloan is a continuing difficulty, as the treatment of notes 
eo 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) • 
• , Id. at 18 . 
•• Natowitz v. Mehlman, 567 F. Supp. 942, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
63 The most significant case outside the Second Circuit discussing both the "in con-
nection with" and causation requirements is Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 
1977). Plaintiffs, the majority shareholders, directors and former officers of a close corpo-
ration, sued the other shareholders, directors and officers, charging thut the defendants 
schemed to oust them from their officerships. A shareholders' agreement provided thut 
only employees of the corporation could be shareholders and set forth a formula for the 
purchase price of the shares upon termination of employment. The Third Circuit, in 
affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, first held thut the "in connection 
with" requirement was not met. What was alleged was basically an intro-corporate dis-
pute over management; the plaintiffs' basic grievance was the termination of their of· 
ficerships. Moreover, the Third Circuit also held that the requisite causation was miss-
ing. There were a number of intervening steps between the fraud and the sale of 
securities, and the defendant's scheme was undertaken to oust the plaintiffs as officers, 
not to bring about the surrender of their stock. Thus, the securities transaction was only 
an indirect consequence of the fraud. 
The Fifth Circuit later distinguished Ketchum in Brown v. lvie, 661 F.2d 62 (5th 
Cir. 1981). In Brown, the plaintiff was ousted from his officership by the defendants and 
required to sell his shares under a shareholders' agreement. Unlike Ketchum, however, 
the Fifth Circuit found a direct connection between the fraud and the securities transac-
tion. In Brown, the defendants, by reason of their ownership of a mDjority of the steek, 
did not have to use fraud to oust the plaintiff from his office. They did, however, deceive 
him into signing a second shareholders' agreement, since the original one was invalid, 
and so the fraud was effected to divest him of his shares. 
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under the federal securities laws demonstrates.64 The Chemical 
Bank61> and the Drysdale Securities Corp.66 cases explore this 
dichotomy in the context of the "in connection with" require-
ment. Thus, Judge Friendly's holding in Chemical Bank rested 
on his belief that the transaction involved a commercial loan, 
which happened to include a pledge of securities.67 On the other 
hand, the court, by the time of the second Drysdale decision, 
was convinced that a transaction involving repos was a securities 
transaction. 
Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc.68 is an excellent example 
of a plaintiff's attempt to convert allegations of "purely" com-
mercial fraud into securities fraud, which the court properly 
thwarted. Shareholders of Teltronics, a bankrupt corporation, 
sued one of its creditors alleging 'that the defendant's press re-
lease, which stated that Teltronics was in default under a loan 
agreement, ultimately led to Teltronics' bankruptcy and the 
"forced sale" of the shareholders' stock. Even if the "forced 
sale" had constituted a securities transaction, and the court held 
that it did not, it is hard to see any connection between the 
press release and the forced sale, except that the press release 
started a chain of events that eventually led to the bankruptcy 
of the corporation. This in no way sounds like the kind of fraud 
that Rule lOb-5 is intended to cover. In Chemical Bank, the 
pledge of securities as an incidental part of a loan transaction 
'" Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1986), provides an extensive discussion of the definitional issue, 
including the various tests applied by the courts. The Touche court suggested that where 
a note does not bear a resemblance to a typical "mercantile" transaction and has a mao 
turity exceeding nine months, it should be deemed a security governed by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 1138. The test applied by the Fifth Circuit was whether the 
note was "issued in the context of a commercial loan transaction." 544 F.2d at 1135 
(citing Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974). The Tenth 
Circuit test is whether the notes were to mature in less than nine months. Id. at 1134 
(citing Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550·52 (10th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit test 
appears to be whether the issuer has superior access to and control of information mate· 
rial to the investment decision. Id. at 1136 (citing Great Western Bank & Trust v. Katz, 
532 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1976) (E. Wright, concurring) • 
•• See notes 17·23 and accompanying text supra . 
•• See notes 21·32 and accompanying text supra. 
67 Judge Friendly contrasted the facts in Chemical Bank with those in Weaver v. 
Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). 
In Weaver, misrepresentations led to the pledge, while in Chemical Bank, misrepresen. 
tations led to a loan secured by a pledge. Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 944 . 
• s 794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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was not sufficient to transform a commercial transaction into a 
securities transaction. Similarly, in Rand, alleged misstatements 
made in a commercial transaction would not give rise to a secur-
ities fraud claim, even if the misstatements had eventually 
brought about a "forced sale." It is significant that in each case 
the only securities transaction alleged was an atypical one: a 
pledge and a liquidation. 
A more difficult case is Bennett v. United States Trust Co. 
of New York. 69 In Bennett; a bank lent money to the plaintiffs 
for the purchase of securities and allegedly made misrepresenta-
tions about the margin requirements. While the Second Circuit 
treated this case as a loss-causation case, it is more properly an-
alyzed as a case involving a commercial transaction. Even 
though the bank allegedly made misstatements about the mar-
gin requirements applicable to the securities, the plaintiffs' use 
of the loan proceeds to purchase securities can be viewed as pe-
ripheral to the loan transaction because the bank did not induce 
the plaintiffs to purchase the securities. 
There is less difficulty in applying the "in connection with" 
requirement in the commercial area than in the breach of duty 
area. The distinction between a commercial transaction and a 
securities transaction is generally drawn by determining whether 
a "security" is present, which involves distinguishing commercial 
notes from investment notes. In drawing the distinction between 
a breach of duty claim and a securities fraud claim, on the other 
hand, the inquiry focuses on the degree of the connection be-
tween the wrong and the securities transaction, since these situ-
ations typically involve an undisputed security. 
C. Commodities Fraud 
As investors continue to diversify their investments, juris-
dictional disputes over the nature of the alleged fraud can be 
expected. Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co.'10 is an excellent example of 
this difficulty. The plaintiff sued both a securities and a com-
modities firm, charging that he was induced by fraudulent mis-
statements about the commodities advisor and his trading pro-
gram to liquidate his stock portfolio and invest those funds into 
•• 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985). 
70 789 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. _ U.S. _ (19&6). 
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a commodities account. The Second Circuit found that no claim 
was stated under Rule lOb-5, since the sale of the securities was 
merely incidental to any fraud that may have occurred in the 
reinvestment of these funds in the commodities account. Since 
all the misrepresentations related to the commodities futures in-
vestments program, there was no fraud "in connection with" a 
securities transaction. At best, only the "but-for" causation 
found insufficient in Chemical Bank was present here. Indeed, 
since, according to the complaint, the plaintiff had already de-
termined to close out his stock portfolio, even "but-for" causa-
tion was absent. The plaintiff stated a federal claim, but the 
claim was for fraud under the Commodities Exchange Act, not 
the Securities Exchange Act.71 
III. Loss CAUSATION 
The requirement of loss causation derives from the tort con-
cept of proximate causation. Loss causation serves to limit the 
damages flowing from a securities fraud and " 'in effect requires 
that the damage claimed be one of foreseeable consequences of 
the misrepresentation.' "72 In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement 
Corp.,73 the Second Circuit viewed the element of causation as 
borrowed from common-law tort principles. In recent cases, 
however, courts have viewed the causation requirement as an as-
pect of the "in connection with" requirement.7• 
In Schlick, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder of Conti-
nental Steel Corp., charged the defendant, the majority share-
holder, with exercising its control over the corporation to de-
fraud the minority shareholders. He alleged that Penn-Dixie 
manipulated and depressed the market value of Continentafs 
stock in relation to Penn-Dixie's stock by using Continental's as-
sets for the benefit of Penn-Dixie, and that Penn-Dixie then 
caused Continental to enter into a merger agreement with Penn-
Dixie, at an unfair exchange ratio. In connection with the 
" Id. at 108-09. But see Smoky Greenhaw Cotton v. Merrill Lynch, 785 F.2d 1274 
(5th Cir. 1986), discussed at note 40 supra • 
•• Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Securities, 801 F.2d at 20-21 (quot· 
ing Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1980» • 
.. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974) . 
.. See, e.g., Nevitsky v. Manufacturers Hanover Brokerage Serv., 654 F. Supp. 116, 
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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merger, Penn-Dixie issued a proxy statement that failed to dis-
close how Penn-Dixie had inflated the value of its shares. 
In Schlick, the Second Circuit distinguished between Rule 
lOb-5 claims based on misrepresentations and omissions, on the 
one hand, and those based on a more comprehensive fraudulent 
scheme, on the other. The court held that where the Rule lOb-5 
claim is based solely on material misrepresentations or omis-
sions, there must be a showing of both loss causation - that the 
misstatements caused the economic harm - and transaction 
causation - that the misstatements caused the plaintiff to en-
gage in the securities transaction. The court held that loss cau-
sation was demonstrated by proof of some form of economic 
damage - in Schlick, the unfair exchange ratio. Transaction 
causation, however, required substantially more. In a case in-
volving misrepresentations, the plaintiff must establish reliance. 
In a case involving omissions, the plaintiff must establish the 
materiality of the undisclosed facts. However, proof of transac-
tion causation was deemed to be unnecessary where, as in 
Schlick the plaintiff alleges a fraudulent scheme including more 
than misstatements; in these cases, loss causation is sufficient.'1G 
In Chemical Bank, transaction causation could be proved: 
the banks could establish that they relied on the misrepresenta-
tions, and that the omissions were material, by establishing that 
had they known the truth about Frigitemp's financial condition, 
they would not have made the loan, including the pledge of 
stock. Nevertheless, Judge Friendly said, while this "but for" 
causation established transaction causation, it was not sufficient 
to establish loss causation because there was no economic dam-
age resulting from the pledge.'16 
In the simplest Rule lOb-5 claim, where, for example, a pur-
chaser of securities claims that he paid too much because of mis-
representations overstating the value of the stock, the dual re-
quirements of loss and transaction causation are easily satisfied. 
In transactions which are indisputably securities transactions, 
economic damage resulting from the transaction is easily proved; 
the stock was not worth what the purchaser paid. Because the 
misrepresentation relates to the investment quality of the secur-
ity, reliance is usually not an issue. In situations like Chemical 
? Id. at 380-81. 
?8 726 F.2d at 943-44. 
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Bank, however, where the securities transaction is incidental to 
the overall transaction, even though the plaintiff can establish 
transaction causation - that he would have acted differently 
had he known the truth - what he would have done differently 
is not enter into a loan transaction. Accordingly, plaintiffs can-
not establish loss causation, because the economic damage re-
sults from a bad loan, not from the stock pledge. As the court 
stated in Drysdale, "[t]he standard for liability in a civil action 
under section lO(b) is causation not merely in inducing the 
plaintiff to enter into a transaction or series of transactions, but 
causation of the actual loss suffered."" 
Thus, in situations where there is no doubt that there is a 
securities transaction, courts may take a more relaxed view of 
the causation requirement, as illustrated in the pre-Chemical 
Bank opinions, Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn78 and Com-
petitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & 
Horwath.79 On the other hand, where it is a close question as to 
whether there is federal securities jurisdiction, the court may fo-
cus on the causation issue and require a closer relationship be-
tween the misstatement and the economic harm, as by insisting 
that the misstatement relate to the investment characteristics of 
the security. This is the approach taken in Chemical Bank and 
Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass.80 
In Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn,81 the Second Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiffs could recover for losses incurred on 
securities purchased on the defendant's recommendations. The 
defendant, a trainee at a brokerage firm, had told the plaintiffs 
that he was a stock broker and a "portfolio management special-
ist." The trial court found that there was no fraud with respect 
to his recommendations. Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs pur-
chased the securities and held on to them while their market 
value declined because of their belief that the defendant was an 
expert, their losses were proximately caused by the defendant's 
77 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
18 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 81-83 infra. 
1. 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 84-85 infra. 
80 754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra & 86-90 
infra. 
81 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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misrepresentations.82 The majority opinion denied that the de-
cline in the market value of the securities was an intervening 
event breaking the chain of causation: 
Differentiating transaction causation from loss causation can be a 
helpful analytical procedure only so long as it does not become a new 
rule effectively limiting recovery for fraudulently induced securities 
transactions to instances of fraudulent representations about the 
value characteristics of the securities dealt in. So concise a theory of 
liability for fraud would be too accommodative of many common 
types of fraud, such as the misrepresentation of a collateral fact that 
induces a transaction.83 
In Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, 
Horwath & Horwath,8' a mutual fund charged that the defend-
ant, an accounting firm, knowingly certified the false financial 
statements of a private investment fund managed by one 
Yamada, in order to induce the plaintiff to hire Yamada t~ man-
age part of its portfolio, in a scheme to facilitate Yamada's stock 
manipulation. As a result, the plaintiff lost several million dol-
lars because of Yamada's unlawful securities transactions. Re-
versing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants, the Second Circuit emphasized that the "plaintiff 
here alleges that the accountants accepted payoffs and othenvise 
actively collaborated with Yamada for the specific purpose of in-
fluencing investors to authorize Yamada to carry out security 
transactions on its behalf."85 
Competitive Associates provides a useful comparison \vith 
the Chemical Bank and Drysdale Securities cases. In Chemical 
Bank, misrepresentations about Frigitemp simply did not cause 
the banks to suffer any injury from the stock pledge, whereas in 
Competitive Associates, misrepresentations about Yamada's in-
vestment company caused the mutual fund to suffer losses from 
his stock manipulation. Moreover, just as in Competitive Associ-
ates, the accountants could foresee (in fact, they int.ended) the 
resulting injury, so, in the Drysdale cases, the accountants could 
foresee the resulting injury. The accountants certified Drysdale's 
financial condition when the marketplace was expressing con-
.2 [d. at 708. 
83 [d. at 710 n.3. 
a< 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975). 
M [d. at 815. 
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cern over the firm's financial condition; indeed, the financial 
statements were furnished to provide assurance on this point. 
While Marbury Management and Competitive Associates 
lessen the significance of loss causation as an independent ele-
ment in a Rule lOb-5 claim, they do so in cases where there is no 
question that the damages resulted from securities transactions, 
and where the foreseeability of the particular damage suffered is 
apparent. Chemical Bank does not overrule these cases and in-
sist that loss causation be established only by misrepresenta-
tions that relate to the investment characteristics of the 
securities. 
The Second Circuit's decision in Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, 
Londin, Rodman & Fass88 is another illustration of the court's 
recognition that the "in connection with" and causation require-
ments are related. 'The trustee for IFC sued the attorneys who 
prepared IFC's registration statements and other disclosure doc-
uments that allegedly misstated or omitted information about 
corporate mismanagement and looting. The court expressed 
doubt that the "in connection with" requirement was met, but 
found it unnecessary to decide this question, since the trustee 
failed to show that the law firm's alleged misconduct caused in-
jury to the corporation. The mismanagement and looting of the 
proceeds from the stock sales was not a direct or foreseeable re-
sult of the law firm's activities.87 
The lower court opinions in the IFC litigation provide more 
extensive analysis of both the "in connection with" and causa-
tion requirements.88 As discussed previously, the district court 
determined that the looting charges met the "in connection 
with" requirement, but the mismanagement charges did not.8D In 
the looting charges brought against the corporate officers and 
another individual who actively participated in the fraud, the 
court found that causation was established, but causation was 
lacking where the defendants were the accounting firm and the 
lawyers90 and the alleged misconduct was recklessness in prepar-
ing the disclosure documents . 
•• 754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra • 
•• Id. at 62. 
88 See In re Investors Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980): 
566 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
•• See note 55 and accompanying text supra . 
• 0 566 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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Two other post-Chemical Ba1)k district court opinions illus-
trate the difficulties that courts are having with the issue of loss 
causation. In First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Op-
penheim, Appel, Dixon & CO.,91 the plaintiffs were former cus-
tomers of Comark, a now insolvent dealer in government securi-
ties. Securities purchased for the plaintiffs were left with the 
dealer for safekeeping, and Comark represented that the securi-
ties would be segregated from its own securities. The clearing 
agent for Comark made overnight loans that, notwithstanding 
the dealer's representations, were secured by the plaintiffs' se-
curities. When the dealer became insolvent, the clearing agent 
liquidated the plaintiffs' securities. The plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendant accounting firm knew about Comark's financial 
problems 'and the fact that it had pledged the customers' securi-
ties and fraudulently misrepresented this information. The court 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the Rule lOb-5 claim 
as to primary liability.92 
Although expressing some uncertainty, the court at least 
tentatively concluded that the "in connection with" requirement 
was met on the basis of Bankers Life, since Oppenheim, Appel, 
Dixon & Coo's (OAD's) fraudulent misrepresentations, which in-
duced the subsequent securities purchases, were nearly contem-
poraneous with the dealer's conversion of the securities.o3 On the 
question of loss causation, the court distinguished this case from 
Chemical Bank: 
OAD's alleged misrepresentations did not relate only to the finan-
cial condition of Comark, with a securities transaction occupying only 
an incidental place in a larger fraudulently induced transaction. 
Rather, the amended complaint alleges that the misrepresentations 
went to the very fraud that later resulted in the loss of plaintiffs' se-
curities, and the direct purchases of securities from Comark consti-
tuted the entire fraudulently induced transaction.1H 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that "the separation between 
the purchases and the harm is too great to support a cause of 
action for securities fraud, at least as to OAD's primary liabil-
0' 29 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) • 
•• Id. at 442 • 
• 3 [d. at 441. 
.. Id. at 441-42. 
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ity."95 The court reached this conclusion because the plaintiffs 
were not injured by the securities purchases, but by the pledge 
of the securities to the clearing agent.98 
This decision appears wrongly decided in light of the com-
plaint's allegations that the accountants knowingly participated 
in the fraud. The court, however, refused to dismiss the com-
plaint against the defendant on a theory of aiding and abetting 
the securities fraud committed by the dealer, so it appears that 
the plaintiffs have another road to the same destination. 
Finally, in Kimmco Energy Corp. v. Jones,9? the plaintiffs 
were also unsuccessful in establishing loss causation. They had 
invested in two partnerships managed by the defendant. Accord-
ing to the plaintiffs, the defendant misrepresented a number of 
significant facts about the activities of the first partnership, the 
apparent success of which led them to invest in the second part-
nership. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the Rule 
lOb-5 claim, the court found that the plaintiffs' allegations were 
inadequate to establish loss causation. It noted that while the 
plaintiffs established transaction causation by their allegations 
that the misrepresentations about the first partnership induced 
them to invest in the second, there were no allegations that the 
defendant was aware, at the time of the misrepresentations, that 
a second partnership would be formed. Thus, there was nothing 
to show that the securities transaction was a foreseeable conse-
quence of the misstatements.98 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear, after Chemica l Bank, that the securities transac-
tion must have a more than incidental involvement with the al-
leged misconduct to satisfy the "in connection with" require-
ment for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction under Rule 
lOb~5. The Drysdale opinions make it clear that loss causation 
does not require that misrepresentations made in a securities 
transaction relate to the investment characteristics of the spe-
.0 Id. at 442. 
··Id . 
• , 603 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) . 
•• [d. at 766-67. 
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cffic securities. Rather, the test remains the same - proximate 
cause, - and the determination of this will continue to be made, 
necessarily, on a case-by-case basis. 
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